Analysis updated 2026-05-18
Understand how a leaked API key hash could bypass LiteLLM authentication.
See how custom guardrails could be abused to reach internal networks or cloud metadata.
Learn how Unicode normalization mismatches can break a code sandbox's blacklist checks.
| regaan/litellm-vulnerability-research | 0xustaz/streamgate | a-bissell/unleash-lite | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stars | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Language | Python | Python | Python |
| Setup difficulty | moderate | hard | hard |
| Complexity | 3/5 | 4/5 | 4/5 |
| Audience | researcher | developer | researcher |
Figures from each repo's GitHub metadata at analysis time.
Proof-of-concept demos require a LiteLLM instance to test against.
This repository collects security research about LiteLLM, a popular tool that many companies use to route requests to different AI models. Rather than being a product to install, it documents three separate security flaws the researcher found while reviewing LiteLLM's source code, along with proof of concept demonstrations for each one. The first finding is an authentication bypass. Because of a logic flaw in how LiteLLM checks API keys, someone who only has a hashed version of a key, rather than the real key itself, can still use it to log in. If that hash belongs to an administrator, the impact could include full account takeover, unauthorized use of paid AI services, and financial cost to the account owner. The second finding involves a feature called custom guardrails, which are meant to add extra safety checks to requests. The research shows these guardrails can make outbound web requests to almost any address, including internal company networks and cloud provider metadata services that often hold sensitive credentials. This could let an attacker scan internal systems or steal cloud secrets. The third finding is a way to escape a supposed sandbox, a restricted environment meant to limit what code can do. The validator that is supposed to block dangerous code checks for certain forbidden text, but it does this before Python's own automatic text normalization runs. That mismatch lets an attacker sneak in blocked commands using different but equivalent character forms, potentially reaching restricted internals, exposing secrets, or running arbitrary code. Each finding has its own folder in the repository with more technical detail and demonstration code. The author identifies themselves and links to a personal website and researcher profile. The repository closes with a clear disclaimer stating everything here is for educational, defensive, and authorized research purposes only, and that any testing should only be done on systems the reader owns or has explicit permission to test.
Security research documenting three LiteLLM vulnerabilities: an authentication bypass, an SSRF flaw, and a sandbox escape, with proof of concept demos.
Mainly Python. The stack also includes Python, LiteLLM.
Setup difficulty is rated moderate, with roughly 30min to a first successful run.
Mainly researcher.
This repo across BitVibe Labs
Verify against the repo before relying on details.